uneasiness has produced acts absolutely unjustifiable; but I hope they will provoke no severities from their governments. A consciousness of those in power that their administration of the public affairs has been honest may, perhaps, produce too great a degree of indignation; and those characters, wherein fear predominates over hope, may apprehend too much from these instances of irregularity. They may conclude too hastily that nature has formed man insusceptible of any other government than that of force, a conclusion not founded in truth nor experience.

Three Forms of Society

Societies exist under three forms, sufficiently distinguishable: (1) without government, as among our Indians; (2) under governments, wherein the will of everyone has a just influence, as is the case in England, in a slight degree, and in our states, in a great one; (3) under governments of force, as is the case in all other monarchies, and in most of the other republics.

"I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical."

To have an idea of the curse of existence under these last, they must be seen. It is a government of wolves over sheep. It is a problem, not clear in my mind, that the first condition is not the best. But I believe it to be inconsistent with any great degree of population. The second state has a great deal of good in it. The mass of mankind under that enjoys a precious degree of liberty and happiness. It has its evils, too, the principal of which is the turbulence to which it is subject. But weigh this against the oppressions of monarchy, and it becomes nothing. *Malo periculo serenam.* I prefer liberty at risk to peaceful servitude. Even this evil is productive of good. It prevents the degeneracy of government and nourishes a general attention to the public affairs.

I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical. Unsuccessful rebellions, indeed, generally establish the encroachments on the rights of the people which have produced them. An observation of this truth should render honest republican governors so mild in their punishment of rebellions as not to discourage them too much. It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government.

For Further Reading


VIEWPOINT 16A

A Republic Must Be Small and Uniform to Survive (1787)

"Brutus"

The U.S. Constitution was written by delegates meeting in a special convention in Philadelphia from May to September 1787. The product of the Constitutional Convention, which then had to be ratified by the states, faced widespread debate. Numerous pamphlets and newspaper articles were published in the succeeding months as “federalists” (supporters of the Constitution) sparred with “anti-federalists.” The following viewpoint is taken from one of the most notable of the anti-federalist essays. It was the first of sixteen articles by "Brutus" published in the New York Journal between October 1787 and April 1788 and widely reprinted elsewhere. Some historians have suggested that the author was Robert Yates (1738–1801) a New York delegate to the Constitutional Convention who refused to sign the Constitution.

"Brutus" criticizes the proposed Constitution for greatly centralizing powers in the national government. He argues that republican government has proved practical only in communities where the population was manageable small and homogeneous, unlike that of America. Many anti-federalist writers like "Brutus" cited the size and diversity of America in asserting that a national regime could not effectively govern without sacrificing the personal freedoms and liberties Americans valued.

How does the Constitution grant the national government "absolute" power, according to "Brutus"? What reasons does he give to support the argument that free republics can only exist in small areas? Which, if any, of his predictions have come true?

From an editorial by “Brutus” that appeared in the October 18, 1787, New York Journal.
The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether a confederated government be the best for the United States or not? Or in other words, whether the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, governed by one legislature, and under the direction of one executive and judicial; or whether they should continue thirteen confederated republics, under the direction and control of a supreme federal head for certain defined national purposes only?

This inquiry is important, because, although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.

A National Government with Absolute Power

This government is to possess absolute and unconstruable power, legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which it extends, for by the last clause of section 8th, article 1st, it is declared "that the Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the United States; or in any department or office thereof." And by the 6th article, it is declared "that this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution, or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." It appears from these articles that there is no need of any intervention of the state governments, between the Congress and the people, to execute any one power vested in the general government, and that the constitution and laws of every state are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this constitution, or the laws made in pursuance of it, or with treaties made under the authority of the United States. . .

The legislature of the United States are vested with the great and unconstruable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers. And are by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter therefore will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in their way. This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds at all. It must be very evident then, that what this constitution wants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire in its exercise and operation.

Can a Nation Be Large and Free?

Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not? It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such an one as to admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the people. The question then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United States, reduced into one state?

If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States. Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. The one is the baron [Charles-Louis] de Montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. xvi. vol. I [book VIII]. "It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacri-
ficed to a thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected." Of the same opinion is the marquis Becarari [Cesare di Beccararia].

History furnishes no example of a free republic, anything like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Romans. Both of these, it is true, in process of time, extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free government to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.

Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things, against it. In every government, the will of the sovereign is the law. In despotic governments, the supreme authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one. In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion concerning it.

The Consent of the People

In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person, but by representatives, chosen by them, who are supposed to know the minds of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this mind.

In every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by which they are governed. This is the true criterion between a free government and an arbitrary one. The former are ruled by the will of the whole, expressed in any manner they may agree upon; the latter by the will of one, or a few. If the people are to give their assent to the laws, by persons chosen and appointed by them, the manner of the choice and the number chosen, must be such, as to possess, be disposed, and consequently qualified to declare the sentiments of the people; for if they do not know, or are not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people do not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few. Now, in a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous and unwieldy, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government.

The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near three millions of souls, and is capable of containing much more than ten times that number. Is it practicable for a country, so large and so numerous as they will soon become, to elect a representation, that will speak their sentiments, without their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of transacting public business? It certainly is not.

The Diversity of the United States

In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply this remark to the condition of the United States, we shall be convinced that it forbids that we should be one government. The United States includes a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse. Their manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions; and their sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and customs of the several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite; each would be in favor of its own interests and customs, and, of consequence, a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective parts, would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but would be composed of such heterogenous and discordant principles, as would constantly be contending with each other.

The laws cannot be executed in a republic, of an extent equal to that of the United States, with promptitude.

The magistrates in every government must be supported in the execution of the laws, either by an armed force, maintained at the public expense for that purpose; or by the people turning out to aid the magistrate upon his command, in case of resistance.

In despotic governments, as well as in all the monarchies of Europe, standing armies are kept up to execute the commands of the prince or the magistrate, and are employed for this purpose when occasion requires: But they have always proved the destruction of liberty, and abhorrent to the spirit of a free republic. In England, where they depend upon the parliament for their annual support, they have
always been complained of as oppressive and unconstitutional, and are seldom employed in executing of the laws, never except on extraordinary occasions, and then under the direction of a civil magistrate.

“A free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants ... as that of the whole United States.”

A free republic will never keep a standing army to execute its laws. It must depend upon the support of its citizens. But when a government is to receive its support from the aid of the citizens, it must be so constructed as to have the confidence, respect, and affection of the people. Men who, upon the call of the magistrate, offer themselves to execute the laws, are influenced to do it either by affection to the government, or from fear; whereas a standing army is at hand to punish offenders, every man is actuated by the latter principle, and therefore, when the magistrate calls, will obey: but, where this is not the case, the government must rest for its support upon the confidence and respect which the people have for their government and laws. The body of the people being attached, the government will always be sufficient to support and execute its laws, and to operate upon the fears of any faction which may be opposed to it, not only to prevent an opposition to the execution of the laws themselves, but also to compel the most of them to aid the magistrate; but the people will not be likely to have such confidence in their rulers, in a republic so extensive as the United States, as necessary for these purposes. The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave; but in a republic of the extent of this continent, the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers; the people at large would know little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change them. The people in Georgia and New Hampshire would not know one another’s mind, and therefore could not act in concert to enable them to effect a general change of representatives. The different parts of so extensive a country could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their representatives, nor be informed of the reasons upon which measures were founded. The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt, and will not support the laws they pass. Hence the government will be nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it otherwise, but by establishing an armed force to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet—a government of all others the most to be dreaded.

In a republic of such vast extent as the United States, the legislature cannot attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. It cannot be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it should have sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this nature, that would be continually arising.

The Abuse of Power

In so extensive a republic, the great officers of government would soon become above the control of the people, and abuse their power to the purpose of aggrandizing themselves, and oppressing them. The trust committed to the executive offices, in a country of the extent of the United States, must be various and of magnitude. The command of all the troops and navy of the republic, the appointment of officers, the power of pardoning offences, the collecting of all the public revenues, and the power of expending them, with a number of other powers, must be lodged and exercised in every state, in the hands of a few. When these are attended with great honor and emolument, as they always will be in large states, so as greatly to interest men to pursue them, and to form proper objects for ambitious and designing men, such men will be ever restless in their pursuit after them. They will use the power, when they have acquired it, to the purposes of gratifying their own interest and ambition, and it is scarcely possible, in a very large republic, to call them to account for their misconduct, or to prevent their abuse of power.

These are some of the reasons by which it appears, that a free republic cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states. If then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the thirteen states into one, as it evidently is, it ought not to be adopted.

VIEWPOINT 16B

A Viable Republic Can Be Large and Diverse (1787)
James Madison (1751–1836)

Political theorist and future president James Madison played a significant role in both instigating and

influencing the 1787 Constitutional Convention. During the ensuing months of debate he wrote numerous articles, letters, and pamphlets urging ratification of the Constitution. His most noteworthy and lasting writings in this debate are the famous Federalist Papers, a series of newspaper articles he co-authored with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay under the pseudonym "Publius." The following view-point is taken from The Federalist No. 10, his first and most famous contribution to the series, which was originally published on November 22, 1787, in the New York Daily Advertiser. Madison was responding in part to arguments made by "Brutus" and other anti-federalists who believed that republican governments were viable only in smaller communities where the "interests of the people should be similar." Madison argues here that republican governments in such situations are vulnerable to the problem of "factions"—the ability of local majorities motivated by selfish concerns to dominate the government, create bad law, and tyrannize the minority. Creating a government over a larger territory, Madison contends, can "extend the sphere" and prevent a single faction from gaining control over the government.

How does Madison define and describe "factions"? What effect does he say the proposed Constitution will have on factions? How does he differentiate between a republic and a democracy? Which of the arguments found here can be seen as direct answers to arguments by "Brutus" in viewpoint 16A?

Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minority, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

The Dangers of Factions

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other: and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the
rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable
obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection
of these faculties is the first object of government.
From the protection of different and unequal facul-
ties of acquiring property, the possession of different
degrees and kinds of property immediately results;
and from the influence of these on the sentiments
and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a di-
vision of the society into different interests and parties.

The Causes of Faction

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the
nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought
into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for dif-
ferent opinions concerning religion, concerning gov-
ernment, and many other points, as well of specula-
tion as of practice; an attachment to different leaders
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power;
or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in
turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much
more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to
co-operate for their common good. So strong is this
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities,
that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the
most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and
excite their most violent conflicts. But the most com-
mon and durable source of factions has been the vari-
ous and unequal distribution of property. Those who
hold and those who are without property have ever
formed distinct interests in society. Those who are
creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like
discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest,
with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in
civilized nations, and divide them into different classes,
actuated by different sentiments and views. The regu-
lation of these various and interfering interests
forms the principal task of modern legislation, and
involves the spirit of party and faction in the neces-
sary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own case,
because his interest would certainly bias his judg-
ment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men
are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same
time; yet what are many of the most important acts
of legislation, but so many judicial determinations,
not indeed concerning the rights of single persons,
but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?
And what are the different classes of legislators but
advocates and parties to the causes which they deter-
mine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It
is a question to which the creditors are parties on
one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought
to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties
are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the
most numerous party, or, in other words, the most
powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall
domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what
degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are
questions which would be differently decided by the
landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably
by neither with a sole regard to justice and the pub-
lic good. The apportionment of taxes on the various
descriptions of property is an act which seems to
require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, per-
haps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity
and temptation are given to a predominant party to
trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with
which they overburden the inferior number, is a
shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will
be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render
them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in
many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all
without taking into view indirect and remote consid-
erations, which will rarely prevail over the immedi-
ate interest which one party may find in disregarding
the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the
causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief
is only to be sought in the means of controlling its
effects.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is
supplied by the republican principle, which enables
the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular
vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse
the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask
its violence under the forms of the Constitution.
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of
popular government, on the other hand, enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the
public good and the rights of other citizens. To
secure the public good and private rights against the
danger of such a faction, and at the same time to pre-
serve the spirit and the form of popular government,
is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum
by which this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long
labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adop-
tion of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently
by one of two only. Either the existence of the same
passion or interest in a majority at the same time
must be prevented, or the majority, having such
Creating a New Government 123

coeexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we will know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

Comparing Republics and Democracies

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischief of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

Extending the Sphere

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

"The extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage."

The influence of factional leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

For Further Reading

VIEWPOINT 17A

The Constitution Needs a Bill of Rights (1788)

Patrick Henry (1736–1799)

A recurring criticism of the Constitution by the anti-federalists during the ratification debates was that it lacked a bill of rights—a list of fundamental freedoms retained by the people that the government could not infringe. Beginning with Virginia in 1776, the majority of the states had included a bill of rights in their state constitutions. However, the 1787 Constitutional Convention, rejecting the wishes of some of its members, did not include such a list. People fearful and critical of creating a new and powerful national government argued that this omission was evidence that such a government could threaten people’s liberties. One influential advocate of this viewpoint was Patrick Henry, perhaps the most prominent and renowned of the anti-federalists. Henry was a longtime Virginia political leader whose oratorical skills had helped to inspire the American Revolution. As a multiple-term governor and leading member of Virginia’s House of Delegates, he dominated Virginia state politics in the 1770s and 1780s. The following viewpoint is taken from speeches he made in June 1788 before the Virginia ratifying convention. Henry argues that the new Constitution will supersede Virginia’s constitution and its bill of rights, thus endangering the people’s freedoms.

From: Patrick Henry’s speech before the Virginia ratifying convention, June 16 and June 17, 1788.